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WHY AIRPLANES CRASH: AVIATION SAFETY IN A CHANGING
WORLD by Clinton V. Oster, Jr., John S. Strong, C. Kurt
Zorn. Oxford University Press, New York, New York,
1992. Pp. xv, 200.
Reviewed by J.E. Murdoch III.
The regulation of aviation safety has always been a
complex, demanding assignment. Oral history has it that
during the early days of the Civil Aeronautics Agency an
inspector would accomplish his duties by hanging around
an airline's ready room. There he would hear tales of bad
equipment from pilots and mechanics on their way to or
from the airline's operations. This episodic sampling
technique is still viewed as the ideal for many of the
world's aviation regulators; one hundred percent surveil-
lance provides a high level of confidence for compliance.
Presidents Carter, Reagan, Bush, and now Clinton have
issued staffing directives that have made the "airline ready
room" surveillance model unrealistic and impossible.
Further, OPM grading systems virtually mandate that the
most senior, knowledgeable FAA personnel are assigned
to manage the certificates of the largest airlines' opera-
tions and maintenance. This places the most expert in-
spectors with the air carriers with the fewest problems.
Finally, Vice President Gore's task force is attempting to
"reinvent the government." This necessitates a close ex-
amination of structural and organizational characteristics
of the FAA. This review questions how the FAA accom-
plishes its mission.
In the context of these developments, trends, and
forces, the Oster/Strong/Zorn examination of aviation
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safety data is most timely and suggests that new methods
of safety regulation may be appropriate. Why Airplanes
Crash analyzes numbers collected by the FAA, NTSB,
ICAO, and other safety bodies, but does so with the new
perspectives and exacting discipline of the academicians.
The conclusions, and more importantly, the questions
their methodologies suggest, need to be closely examined
by the Congress, the Administration, the Department of
Transportation, the FAA, and the aviation community
during their joint examination of the aviation safety regu-
latory function.
The authors quickly dispatch the premise that deregula-
tion has caused any diminution of safety by a rigorous re-
view of the data. They then shift their focus to the data
available, detailing the strengths and weaknesses of each
of the sources. Next, these three professors catalogue
traditional causes that the relevant safety agencies attri-
bute to the accidents. Historically, the last factor cited in
the report was the cause of the accident/incident. The in-
novative approach adopted by these academicians is to lay
the blame on the event that initiated the sequence of ac-
tions that resulted in the accident (p. 26). The authors
explain that such a different approach results in some
changes in data classification; pilot errors that were previ-
ously identified as "unforced" now may be attributed to
the engine failure that was the first, although perhaps not
controlling, event.
Based on this novel approach, Professors Oster, Strong,
and Zorn develop "risk tiers" (p. 7), categories of per-
formance or correlation between certain actions and re-
sults. These analytical constructs suggest areas for
increased regulatory emphasis. One such risk tier derives
from an examination of the causes for accidents (p. 30).
While "equipment failure" and "environment" pose
greater threats and would be fertile areas for increased
FAA scrutiny and effort, surprisingly "seatbelt not fast-
ened" is the next highest risk tier. This conclusion sug-
gests that the FAA would be well advised to spend time
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and dollars on a public education program addressing the
value of wearing a seatbelt while travelling. During a pe-
riod of decreased budgets, it is ironic to spend more
money on an advertising effort similar to NHTSA' televi-
sion crash-dummy program. However, it may be more ef-
fective to incur such costs than to attempt to improve
safety through traditional regulatory methods - adding
rules, increasing surveillance, etc. A public awareness
campaign might produce a significant improvement in
safety results at a relatively small cost.
More striking and pertinent to the FAA's internal mis-
sion are the book's conclusions, made in several contexts,
that bigger entities pose lesser safety risks. Historically,
the agency has assigned its most senior, capable opera-
tions and maintenance experts to regulate the Uniteds,
Americans, Comairs, and Air Wisconsins - the carriers
with the largest fleets, most pilots, and most mechanics.
These regulated entities provide "numbers," which allow
the FAA to justify to OPM GS-15 grades. These impor-
tant certificates received greater scrutiny than the organi-
zations more susceptible to failure. The data developed
by Professors Oster, Strong, and Zorn indicate that the
greatest safety risks are found outside these "large" classi-
fications and reside with the smaller, less sophisticated or-
ganizations. The GS-15, the resulting hypothesis would
suggest, should not use his/her expertise to regulate the
knowledgeable, well-established, large airlines, but would
be better utilized guiding the new company with less ex-
perience, less developed systems, new personnel, and as-
of-yet, unperfected procedures.
The authors examine seven major issues in Why Air-
planes Crash. First, they analyze the major U.S. airlines,
those operating under 14 C.F.R. Parts 121 and 135, and
ask some questions about these two classes of carriers
based on trends in the data developed under this new
method (Chapter 2). Their second area of focus is the
segment of the less regulated and less scrutinized U.S. op-
erators - jet charter operators, air taxi operators, cargo
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carriers, and general aviation (Chapter 3). The profes-
sors ask some telling questions about this matching of pi-
lot skills and aircraft capabilities with the operational
missions of these entities. Their next focus is to compare
the U.S. experience with Canada's track record (Chapter
4). While the Canadian authorities apply different ap-
proaches, the performances of the two aviation industries
are roughly comparable. What is different is a variation in
pilot performance between the two countries: The air-
men of Canada (as well as those flying in Alaska) evidence
a lower rate of error. The authors leave open the ques-
tion of why this delta exists.
The fourth inquiry (Chapter 5) is a macro comparison
of the North American safety history as against the global
record. It is not surprising that the United States and
Canada grade out significantly better than other regions;
the authors' conclusion that Western Europe has done
equally well is also expected. It is, however, revealing that
certain factors (e.g., engine failure - Africa, weather - Mid-
dle East, pilot error - Latin America and Africa, terrorism
- Africa, terrain - Middle East) are clearly targets that the
local aviation safety organization should emphasize for
improvement.
Based on NTSB Member Laubers's interesting observa-
tion that there is a need for "leading safety indicators,"
Chapter 6 attempts to develop such data. After a thor-
ough definition of possible operational and economic cri-
teria, the professors disappointingly conclude no
statistically significant measures of merit exist.
Recent events (the Aloha B-737 fuselage failure) com-
pel the authors to review the data on aging aircraft (Chap-
ter 7). They conclude that the FAA's and the industry's
recent change in maintenance and inspection procedures
is sound. There is some need, however, to give more at-
tention to existing data, to enhance the interpretation of
the trends that such reports suggest, and to develop mul-
tinational maintenance standards (necessitated by the
movement of equipment among nations - a phenomena
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facilitated by the global leasing companies). The basic
message here is that the FAA and industry responded well
to this crisis, but that more can be done to prevent similar
phenomena in the future.
The final area of inquiry is the politically charged issue
of terrorism. While the data suggest that there has been
improvement in preventing or interdicting such threats,
the authors observe that the technical sophistication of
the terrorists compels further emphasis on operational
and technological strategies to respond to this worrisome
risk.
The final chapter summarizes the previous conclusions
and adds some other useful observations. Professors
Oster, Strong, and Zorn have brought some new perspec-
tives to a debate that is replete with data and scarce on
useful conclusions. Their book provides new devices that
contribute to the comprehension of the numbers, sug-
gests questions that require further scrutiny, and identi-
fies solutions that may respond to the concurrent
conflicting demands of lower budgets and higher de-
mands for improved performance. Why Airplanes Crash ad-
vances our understanding of the dynamic, difficult task of
aviation safety regulation through some worthwhile analy-
ses that derive from an academic discipline. The book
provides important thoughts that those charged with reg-
ulating the FAA should carefully consider.
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